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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E. STEELE 
TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON 
and W. FRED HURST 
Appellants/Petitioners, 
vs . 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS and THE CAREER 
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD of the ] 
State of Utah, ; 
Respondents/Agencies. ; 
) REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/ 
) PETITIONERS 
> Case No. 20040376 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS DAN LEATHAM, ROBERT E. 
STEELE, TIM SLOCUM, HAROLD W. JOHNSON AND W. FRED HURST 
APPEAL FROM THE UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
Appellants/Petitioners Dan Leatham, Robert E. Steele, 
Tim Slocum, Harold W. Johnson and W. Fred Hurst (herein 
"Petitioners") submit this Reply Brief for consideration by 
the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
RESPONDENTS' ASSERTION THAT PETITIONERS MUST MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE IS INCORRECT BECAUSE PETITIONERS HAVE 
NOT CHALLENGED THE FINDINGS OF FACT BUT HAVE 
CHALLENGED THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF ITS CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW BASED ON THE ABSENCE OF FINDINGS OF FACT BY 
THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD IN THIS MATTER. 
THUS, RESPONDENT'S MARSHALING ARGUMENT IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
In Argument I of Respondents' Brief, Respondents argue 
that Petitioners' Appellate Brief is premised on a challenge 
to the findings of fact issued by the Step 5 Hearing Officer 
(herein xxthe Hearing Officer") and the Career Service Review 
Board (herein "the CSRB"). Respondents' argument is, 
however, non-responsive to Petitioner's arguments on appeal 
because Petitioners have not challenged any of the findings 
of fact made below. Rather, Petitioners have argued that 
the Hearing Officer and the CSRB failed to make any explicit 
findings of fact that Petitioners had excusable neglect, or 
alleged lack there of, incident to the filing of their 
grievance. While the Step 5 Hearing Officer did make a 
conclusion of law, he did not make any finding of fact on 
this issue.1 Moreover, the CSRB did not make any 
independent finding of fact on this issue but erroneously 
affirmed the "nonexistent finding of fact" of the Hearing 
1. In spite of Respondents using four (4) pages of its 
Brief to recite, verbatim, the Hearing Officer's Findings of 
Fact, Respondents do not direct this Court to any of the 
findings in support of their position that a factual finding 
was made on the excusable neglect issue. 
2 
Officer on this issue. (R.369, 499, 515).2 
Petitioners therefore respectfully submit that they are 
not required to marshal evidence to support a nonexistent 
finding of fact and Respondents' marshaling argument is 
inapplicable and should not be well-taken.3 
II 
THE CSRB'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
RULE SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE CSRB 
INCORRECTLY INTERPRETS THE REPRISAL PROHIBITION 
CONTAINED IN U.C.A 67-19a-303(3) (1991) 
Petitioners and Respondents disagree on the standard of 
review to be applied by this Court concerning the CSRB's 
decision that excusable neglect can never, as a Inatter of 
law, be predicated on an employee's objective fear of 
retaliation/reprisal by management. Petitioners 
respectfully submit that Respondents' argument for an 
intermediate standard of review, under Holland v. Career 
2. Contrary to Respondents' assertion, Petitioners are not 
required to marshal the evidence because Petitioners are not 
challenging the CSRB's findings of fact but rather its 
conclusions of law. See, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens 
v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009, 1014 (Utah 2002) (challenges to a 
trial court's legal determinations do not require marshaling 
the evidence). 
3. Id. 
3 
Service Review Board, 856 P.2d 678, 681 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) 
would be appropriate in any circumstance that did not 
necessary implicate a separate statutory prohibition enacted 
by the Legislature. Thus, for example, an employee who 
might become seriously ill for an extended time period such 
that his/her time period for filing a grievance might lapse 
while he/she is on sick leave would fall within the scope of 
the CSRB's rule on excusable neglect. 
The circumstance in the case before the Court, however, 
necessary implicates a second provision in the organic 
statute governing the CSRB, namely, U.C.A. 67-19a-
303(3)(1991), which prohibits reprisals by management, to-
"wit: 
>x(3) No person may take any reprisals against 
any career service employee for use of 
grievance procedures specified in this 
chapter." 
Thus, it is the CSRB's interpretation of the excusable 
neglect statute, in connection with the reprisal prohibition 
provision, that creates an initial legal issue regarding the 
standard of review in this matter.4 Petitioners 
4. Thus, Petitioners assert the Court must harmonize the 
4 
respectfully submit that this Court is in as good a position 
to interpret both of the foregoing statutes as is the CSRB. 
Accordingly,, Petitioners submit that the correction of error 
standard should be applied in this case with no deference 
being given to the CSRB's legal conclusion regarding whether 
Petitioners' objective fear of retaliation would constitute, 
as a matter of law, excusable neglect under the CSRB's 
organic statute. Thus, Petitioners would submit that 
Petitioners are entitled to the relief sought in their 
Appellate Brief without any deference being 
accorded/afforded to the CSRB's decision in this matter. 
Even, arguendo, if this Court were to apply an 
intermediate standard of review to the CSRB's Decision on 
this issue, Petitioners respectfully submit that the CSRB's 
Decision is neither reasonable nor rational because it fails 
excusable neglect provision created in U.C.A. 67-19a-
401(5) (a)(i-ii)(1999) with the reprisal provision quoted in 
the text. While the excusable neglect provision includes a 
legislative grant of rulemaking authority to the CSRB that 
would suggest an intermediate standard of review under 
Holland, the reprisal statute does not contain such 
authority thereby suggesting a correction of error standard. 
Petitioners submit this presents a question of first 
impression not heretofore addressed in the context of an 
appeal from any decision concerning the CSRB. 
5 
to properly harmonize the reprisal statute as set forth 
hereinabove.5 Inasmuch as the CSRB is required, as a 
principal of statutory interpretation, to harmonize its 
statutes, Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of 
Bountiful, 52 P.3d 1174, 1176, 510 (Utah 2002)(principles of 
statutory interpretation require the provisions to be 
harmonized NXin accordance with legislative intent so as to 
give meaning to each provision"), Petitioners respectfully 
submit that the CSRB's Decision fails to appropriately 
harmonize its organic statute in light of the Legislature's 
intention to preclude an objective fear of 
retaliation/reprisals against merit employees. 
5. The CSRB's Decision held that it is only "actual 
reprisals" (as opposed to objective fear of reprisal) that 
invokes the CSRB's statutory authority. Petitioners' 
Appellate Brief, at pages 18-19, specifically analyzes the 
fundamental flaw in the CSRB's analysis, to-wit: The CSRB 
does not have statutory authority to adjudicate grievances 
based on actual reprisals and the CSRB cannot realistically 
enforce the statutory mandate unless objective fear of 
retaliations/reprisals is/are included within the definition 
of excusable neglect. Significantly, Respondents' Brief 
fails to address Petitioners' argument on this issue. 
Petitioners submit Respondents' omission of any argument is 
because no compelling or persuasive argument can be 
presented in opposition thereto. 
6 
Ill 
THE TWENTY (20) DAY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
WAS TOLLED BY THE EQUITABLE DISCOVERY RULE 
A. The Concealment Prong of the Equitable Discovery Rule 
Operates to Toll the Statute of Limitations 
In the recent decision of Russell Packard Development, 
Inc. v. Carson, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah, March 1, 
2005),6 the Utah Supreme Court clarified the test for the 
concealment prong of the equitable discovery rule as 
follows: 
6. In Russell Packard, the Utah Supreme Court distinguished 
between a "statutory discovery rule" (where the statute 
itself mandates application of the discovery rule) and an 
"equitable discovery rule" (where the statute does not 
include a discovery rule mandate) and concluded that the 
discovery rule operates differently under each situation. 
In Petitioners' Initial Brief, which was filed prior to the 
Russell Packard decision, Petitioners argued that the 
"excusable neglect" provision contained in U.C.A. 67-19a-
401(5)(1999), acted as a tolling mechanism but did not argue 
the same constitutes a "discovery" statute. In light of the 
Utah Supreme Court's analysis in the Russell Packard 
decision, Petitioners do not believe that the "excusable 
neglect" provision constitutes a "statutory discovery rule" 
comparable to the one discussed in Russell Packard (i.e., 
U.C.A. §78-12-26(3) that provides a cause of action will not 
accrue "until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the 
facts constituting the fraud malice."). See, Russell 
Packard at 5121. Thus, Petitioners submit that, in the case 
at bar, the twenty (20) day statute of limitations does not 
contain a "statutory discovery rule" and is therefore 
subject to the concealment and exceptional circumstances 
prongs of the equitable discovery rule. 
7 
"First, a plaintiff may successfully toll a 
statute of limitations by showing that, given 
the defendant's concealment of the plaintiff's 
cause of action, the plaintiff neither 
discovered nor reasonably should have 
discovered the facts underlying the cause of 
action before the limitations period expired. 
Once a plaintiff makes this showing, the 
concealment version of the discovery rule will 
operate to toll the relevant statute of 
limitations, and the limitations period will 
not commence unti 
possessed 
the facts 
actual 
forming 
1 the date the plaint 
or constructive knowl 
the basis of his or 
iff 
edge 
her 
of 
cause 
of action. Russell Packard, 520 Utah Adv. Rep 
15, 5129 (Utah 2005) . ; 
7. Respondents' Brief cites to Berenda v. Langford, 914 
P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996), are misplaced. Berenda, does not 
apply to the case at bar for three reasons: first, Berenda 
involves tolling where there is a statutory discovery rule, 
whereas the case at bar involves an equitable discovery 
rule; second, the quotation from Berenda in Respondents' 
Brief was not the Utah Supreme Court's holding but the 
Defendant's argument, that the Utah Supreme Court rejected, 
to wit: 
"However, under our case law the rule is otherwise 
when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant 'took 
affirmative steps to conceal the plaintiff's cause 
of action, as is the case here. In such a 
situation, the plaintiff can avoid the full 
operation of the discovery rule by making a prima 
facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then 
demonstrating that given the defendant's actions, a 
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the 
claim earlier." Berenda at 51-52. 
And third, the Utah Supreme Court in Russell Packard, 
further clarified that: 
8 
The Utah Supreme Court explained that the concealment 
prong of the discovery rule balances the following policy 
considerations: 
"[T]he discovery rule balances (1) the policy 
underlying all statutes of limitations " T to 
promote justice by preventing surprises through 
the revival of claims that have been allowed to 
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories 
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared,! " 
914 P.2d at 52 (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86 
(further citation omitted)), with (2) the policy 
of "not allowing a defendant who has concealed 
his wrongdoing to profit from his concealment," 
id. (citing Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 
342, 349, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1874) (further citation 
omitted))." Id. at 528. 
"[I]nquiry notice 
plaintiff alleges 
affirmative steps 
operates differently "when a 
that a defendant took 
to conceal the plaintiff's 
cause of action." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. When 
a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of 
fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff will be 
charged with constructive notice of the facts 
forming the basis of a cause of 
that point at which a plaintiff, 
action only at 
reasonably on 
notice to inquire into a defendant's wrongdoing, 
would have, with due diligence, 
facts forming the basis for the 
despite the defendant's efforts 
discovered the 
cause of action 
to conceal it. 
See id. at 51-52." Russell Packard Development, 
Inc. at 138. 
Respondents' reliance on Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 
P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) and Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc., 920 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) for the same 
proposition is thus likewise misplaced. 
9 
January of 1998 was the first time Petitioners had 
actual knowledge8 that they were entitled to on-call time 
compensation encompassed within their grievance. It is 
undisputed that prior to July of 1997, Petitioners were 
subject to a coercive regime of administrations who mislead 
Petitioners about their entitlement to on-call compensation 
(R.373), who also directed them not to file time-sheets that 
included on-call time (R.373-374, 514), and who even 
threatened to terminate the employment of the Department's 
Administrative Law Judge when he filled out time cards with 
on-call time (R.366). In light of Respondents' misleading 
conduct, Petitioners' conduct in filing their grievance in 
January of 1998 is reasonable and the applicable statute of 
limitations was tolled. As noted by Justice Durrant in 
8. Respondents argue that there was sufficient facts to put 
Petitioners on notice on two grounds. First, the rule 
dealing with on-call compensation was available; and, 
second, Petitioners received on-call pay for Officer in 
Charge (herein "OIC") time after July of 1997. In response 
to the Respondents' first claim of notice, the Utah Supreme 
Court has previously held that administrative rules (in and 
of themselves) do not constitute notice. See, Worrall v. 
Ogden City Fire Dep't, 616 P.2d 598, 600-602 (Utah 1980). 
Regarding the OIC on-call time, Petitioners submit they 
sought on-call compensation for non-OIC on-call ~ime and, 
hence, OIC on-call time does not constitute any relevant 
notice. 
10 
Russell Packard: 
"If we were to look only to whether a 
plaintiff theoretically could have brought a 
suit before the limitations period expired 
without looking to the relative reasonableness 
or unreasonableness of that action under the 
circumstances, we would reward a defendant's 
fraudulent and deceptive misbehavior by 
depriving an innocent plaintiff of a 
reasonable period within which to act. This 
we refuse to do. MT]o permit one practicing 
a fraud and then concealing it to plead the 
statute 
injured 
of limitations whe m, in fact, 
party did not know of and cou 
with reasonable diligence 
fraud' would be xnot only 
morals, but also contrary 
the 
ild not 
have discovered 
subversive 
the 
of good 
to the plainest 
principles of justice.' 51 Am. Jur. 2d 
Limitations of Actions §183 (2004)." Russell 
Packard Development, Inc. at 528. 
B. The Exceptional Circumstances Prong of the Equitable 
Discovery Rule Operates to Toll the Twenty (20) Day Statute 
of Limitations. 
The exceptional circumstances prong of the equitable 
discovery rule involves a balancing test: 
XNNThe ultimate determination of whether a case 
presents exceptional circumstances that render 
the application of a statute of limitations 
irrational or unjust' is a balancing test. Id. 
The balancing test 
on the claimant by 
weighs the hardship imposed 
the application of the 
statute of limitations against any prejudice 
to the defendant resulting from the passage of 
time. Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. Some factors 
this court considers in applying this test 
include whether the defendant's problems 
11 
caused by the passage of time are greater than 
the plaintiff!s, whether the defendant 
performed a technical service that the 
plaintiff cannot reasonably have been expected 
to evaluate, and whether the claim has aged to 
the point that witnesses cannot be located, 
evidence cannot be found, and the parties 
cannot remember basic events. See Klinger, 7 91 
P.2d at 872; Myers, 635 P.2d at 87." Sevy v. 
Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 
629, 636 (Utah 1995) . 
In weighing the hardship on Petitioners (by imposing 
the twenty (20) day statute of limitation) against the 
prejudice, if any, as the Respondents, Petitioners submit 
the scales weigh heavily in favor of the Petitioners. The 
Respondents created the circumstances that prevented 
Petitioners from being paid for on-call time worked and 
further directed Petitioners not to file time sheets with 
on-call time through July of 1997. It is only after July of 
1997 that Petitioners were directed to file time sheets with 
limited on-call time for OIC on-call time. Again, had 
Respondents wanted to protect themselves from potential 
grievances, all they had to do was pay the Petitioners as 
required by law. If Petitioners are limited to recovering 
only the compensation for the twenty (20) working days prior 
to the filing of their grievance in January of 1998, 
Respondent's use of fear and intimidation will be sustained. 
12 
This Court should not condone such misconduct and should 
reverse the CSRB's Decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the CSRB's Decision and order the Respondents to 
rightfully award Petitioners' on-call compensation in a 
fashion consistent with their "made whole'' request contained 
in their grievance. 
DATED th is ? f- day of , 2005 
Respectfully submitted, 
>hillip W. Dyer, Esq, 
Carey A. Seager, Esq. 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
MI/E:/client/UPEA/UGOP/Leatham/Appeal Brief (Court of Appeals) 
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